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Abstract 
The paper attempts to conciliate the important distinction between what-is, or 
exists, and what-is-not _thereby supporting Russell’s existential analysis _with 
some Meinongian insights. For this purpose, it surveys the varied inhabitants of the 
realm of ‘non-being’ and tries to clarify their diverse statuses. The position that 
results makes it possible to rescue them back in surprising but non-threatening 
form, leaving our ontology safe from contradiction.  
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1. Entering the goddess’s forbidden path 
The world of non-existence is surprisingly overpopulated: from fictions to pure 
non-existents, quasi-existents, and non-actuals, to thick and thin universals, poems 
and maybe symphonies, maybe numbers, and the whole troop of the impossibles. 
These ‘homeless objects’1are all lodged in realms that we know to be in some sense 
different from the real experiential world, but, somehow, there too. Giving an 
account of how they can be there in their peculiar, non-existent way is a long-
standing puzzle.   
To work our way into this ghostly ‘jungle’ it will be helpful to first 
distinguish the different sub-species from each other. This can be achieved, for 
example, by considering the diverse ways in which they relate to what we can 
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characterise as ‘ordinary existence’ in the actual world. For the sake of drawing the 
line – which we ex-ante assume to be drawable, or else we would not make sense 
of the problem, nor be discussing it at all – I will specify what I mean by ‘ordinary 
existence’. No entity can be said to exist in the actual world in an ordinary sense if 
it is not possible to have some kind of experiential acquaintance with it. This need 
not be understood, of course, in literal Russellian terms, but it sets indeed a 
requirement to prove that the experiential conditions of application of 
corresponding statements are satisfied in order to make them true.2 Therefore, no 
entity can be said to exist in the actual world if a) it is not possible to access some 
spatio-temporal experience that would make claims about it true (if it cannot be said 
to take place at a given point of time and in a given situation), b) if we cannot regard 
judgments about it as being actually true on some such basis; c) if it is not possible 
to reidentify3 it through different judgements in alternative contexts and d) if it can 
have no causal impact on other such entities. Correspondingly, if an entity satisfies 
the opposite requirements to a), b), c) and d), we would agree that it exists. For 
exposition purposes, though, I will allow talk of ‘non-ordinary' ways of existence 
in describing how entities are said to be there other than in the sense described. 
With these clarifications, let us start our surveillance of non-beings.  
 
a. Fictions (Sherlock Holmes, Pegasus, etc.). These would denote individuals 
who are invented and taken to exist in invented worlds. They will never 
exist in the real actual world, nor will their defining properties be 
instantiated in it. Some real experiential individual might exhibit 
resemblances to Sherlock Holmes, but he would not be him.  
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b. Pure non-existents (the alien captured by NASA, Vulcano, Phlogiston, etc.). 
These so denoted guys, unlike Sherlock Holmes or Darth Vader (who were 
never postulated as potential experiential candidates), were described as 
existent in the actual world, but we found proof that they do not. Thus, they 
actually have no existence at all, not even in fiction,4 nor did they exist and 
pass away. A sub-sort of them, however, about whose existence or non-
existence we have no proof (they might already exist or come to existence 
some time), might be characterised as: 
b.1. Potential existents (an engineered rational being resulting from 
the combination of canine and human DNA, a super-intelligent 
human being with telepathic capacities, unbelievable sorts of super-
powerful robots, etc.) could be species of such. Their ambition is to, 
at some point, have ordinary existence, but they do not. 
c. Quasi-existents5 (individual witches, shamans, saints, etc.). These are 
peculiar folks, since while they make it possible to identify some real 
existent beings as their denotation, they mislead us into thinking that what 
we have identified is a being with properties beyond those which the 
ordinary existent being actually has. For example, experiencing a person 
seemingly in trance, claiming to access the spiritual world, acting as a 
healing figure, using ailments and other non-standard procedures in treating 
others’ illnesses, made it possible to identify a ‘Shaman’, but on such 
experiential basis further extraordinary powers were attributed to him.6 
Quasi-existents, thus, never properly existed, but there was a specific 
experience on whose behalf they were identified. As such an experience it 
is not merely meant some causal effects in the experiential world that made 
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it possible to presume their existence, as with some theoretical entities; in 
this sense they differ from pure, exposed, non-existents too. Their relation 
to ordinary existence can therefore be characterised as misleading.  
d. Non-actuals (Socrates; Napoleon; Cervantes; Tolong – the dog I someday 
will have already been baptised by my niece). These comprise individuals 
who have been or, predictably, will be, ordinary existent beings, but are 
actually not such. Their relation to ordinary existence can be characterised 
as transient.  
e. Generalia. Here I will include, in an uncritical way, conceptual meanings 
and, more generally, the so-called ‘universals’. The actual existent world 
might exemplify them, but they themselves would not have ordinary 
existence as such and never will. If they exist, they do so in some other 
realm. 
f. Subject-dependents (symphonies, poems, tastes, pains, etc.). Whether these 
should be considered in this enumeration is much more questionable, but 
since other authors make a case about them, I will include them too. They 
would exist in ordinary reality as much as our bodily feelings in general do; 
their existence requires our existence, but they are also experientable just 
the same as all other beings that constitute what we consider standard cases 
of ordinary existence. They depend upon experiences that we conceptually 
capture, locally7 and in a timely manner. This aspect differentiates them 
from fictions and other non-existents, since the latter are not experienced as 
such. There is a difference between the thinking process and what the 
process is about. We can be said to experience thinking but not to experience 
the entity that Sherlock Holmes is supposed to be. Poems, though, have a 
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mixed character, in the sense that they partially belong to the fictional and, 
to some extent, the generalia groups, but full grasp of them requires 
experiencing their musicality too. 
g. Impossibles (the round square, the simultaneously red and green all over 
book). Clearly, they are not and will never be part of ordinary existence; 
furthermore, ordinary existence absolutely abhors them. Among all of the 
non-existent folks, these are by far the most radically threatening ones. This 
can be for logical or empirical reasons. The above are impossible for logical 
reasons, but there is an empirical sub-sort: 
g.1. Empirically impossibles (human beings who do not breath, stars 
made out of cotton). These are impossible according to what we 
know about natural laws. Their impossibility to take place in 
ordinary existence depends on how right we are in our knowledge 
about natural world laws. They would differ from what I have called 
‘potential existents’ in that, according to our actual knowledge, the 
latter do not exist, but what we know about the world does not make 
their coming into being completely impossible.   
h. Numbers (0 and the rest). These are as numerous as one wishes, up to 
infinity, although some of the others could also parallel this capacity. Their 
relation to ordinary existence is the most intriguing one. Although they do 
not exist in the experiential world, and never will, they appear to be 
somehow essential to it too. Unlike pure non-existents, they were never 
postulated as real standard existent individuals, and like fictions and 
generalia, their existence, if at all, would be in some other realm.   
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With this, I think I have a fair taxonomy to start with and to try to make sense of 
their diverse statuses and of their status as a whole. 
2. Meinognian objects or Russellian impostors: Do we have to choose?  
Russell’s (1905) analysis of non-denoting expressions in terms of definite 
descriptions was thought of as a measure to debunk deceiving ontological 
proliferations of the Meinognian type. This also allowed him to provide a better 
solution to the problem of negative existential sentences, with which he had earlier 
struggled. Russell’s achievement was, I believe, a huge step towards clarifying 
when we should be legitimised to assume the existence of what we talk about and 
when we should not, and how we should conduct a corresponding proof. This is a 
position abounded upon by Quine (1953) in his critique of Meinong-like views.  
Indeed, we can easily be misled by linguistic appearances, assuming the 
ordinary existence of the presumed referents of our denoting terms. With this, I 
want to make clear where I stand in this regard, in case what I have to say in what 
follows should raise any doubt. To expand our ontology, as Meinong (1888) does, 
to say that with ‘the present King of France’ we are referring to an ‘object’ of a 
peculiar non-being8 sort, which is already pre-given and is logically prior to our 
judgement about its existence or non-existence (has ‘external Being’, Aubersein: 
§4) and constitutes some more basic ‘grade of Being’, is completely uneconomic 
and confusing. Consider the following quotes 
 
Should I judge of an object that it is not, so it seems that I have to have apprehended 
it first to say from it that it doesn’t exist (Meinong 1988: 10, §4 ‘On the Externality 
(Aubersein) of the pure object’). 
 
We have to do with a Being, that has neither existence nor subsistence (Bestand), 
but just to the extent that to both, if one can put it so, as grades of Being, existence 
and subsistence, a third grade is to be added. This Being would then belong to each 
object as such. (ibidem: 10).9 
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The idea, therefore, is that in considering, for example, ‘the present King of France’, 
we might judge ‘that the present king of France does not exist’. The that-clause 
constitutes what he calls an ‘Objective’, by which we are apprehending an object 
not merely a representation of it (Meinong 1988: 9)10 that has Being (in the third 
grade of our last quote) and which we judge as not existing.  
Such an ontology, which embraces all kinds of non-beings, possibles, and 
impossibles (for which this ‘pre-given way of Being as ‘Aubersein’ holds too), 
would seem to betray the very sense of the term ontology and its allusion to ‘what 
there is’ as opposed to ‘what is not there’. Meinong’s introduced ‘So-sein-objects’ 
(to refer to their having ‘a given way of being’ even if they do not exist) which he 
wants to distinguish from ‘existent objects’ are already more than mere 
descriptions. They are understood as what the description is about and, therefore, 
as having Being. This is, for him, the case with both non-existent objects and 
possibilities, and also with fictions (such as the golden mountain, which is golden 
and a mountain even if it does not exist). The difference with ‘real Being’ is 
something which he wants to make palatable by using the contrast between ‘So-
sein’ and ‘Sein’ – a distinction that, strictly speaking, would work if the former, as 
the term expresses, is understood as a mere predication, a mere description of a 
specific way of being. But it rather amounts to seeing the description (which with 
Russell’s procedure would come out as unsaturated) as already concerning an 
object with a peculiar degraded way of being of the ‘non-being sort’. He then can 
be said to split this elementary Being into the existent and the non-existent (So-
sein) types. Thus, we arrive at a conception that to avoid paradox separates the 
notion of Being from that of Existence, as just seen, and splits then Being into two 
sorts (existent and non-existent). However, the resource of saying that something is 
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(has some objectual pre-given grade of Being) but does not exist strikes one as some 
kind of prestidigitation trick, not far from the claim that ‘what-is-not is’, which 
already set all alarms by Parmenides centuries ago. Such talk attracted equally harsh 
critique from Russell, who sharply noticed that even the predication of existence 
had to be allowed in Meinong’s picture of the non-existent objects: 
but the chief objection is that such objects, admittedly, are apt to infringe the law 
of contradiction. It is contended, for example, that the existent present King of 
France exists, and also does not exist; that the round square is round, and also not 
round, etc. But this is intolerable; and if any theory can be found to avoid this 
result, it is to be preferred (Russell 1905: 483). 
 
By way of such a reconstruction, Russell attempted to show, in Meinong’s own 
terms, as Bourgeois (1981) argues, the incorrectness of a theory that makes it 
possible to predicate existence of an object that does not exist and make further 
contradictory claims. Meinong’s attempt to distinguish ‘being existent’ (as a mere 
predication) from ‘exist’ in his reply to Russell (Meinong 1907: §3, 1910: §20) 
was, in Russell’s eyes, just an artificial manoeuvre that disguised one and the same 
thing (Russell 1907: 439) as two different ones. Notably, even some who, like 
Bourgeois (1981: 665), tried to make sense of Meinong’s response, concluded 
finding his proposed solution unable to surmount the core of Russell’s objection; 
the objection allowed being reformulated using ‘exists’ itself as a predication and 
attributing it to an object that does not exist. Finally, I do not think the 
nuclear/extranuclear differentiation helps any better to make sense of Meinong’s 
distinction, which Parsons (1974: 574) tried to apply to ‘existent golden Mountain’. 
Nuclear properties are those that according to the description constitute the object, 
‘being golden’, ‘being existent’, extranuclear ones those that are dependent upon 
external factors such as existence or non-existence. The distinction could be said to 
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achieve some clarification of the Meinongian position, maybe, but at the price of 
acknowledging a predicative mode of existence that ends up being devoid of its 
very sense, making its attribution worthless. The alternative proposed by Jacquette 
(1996: 81) to consider existence an extranuclear property and, thus, not to allow its 
nuclear use, could work better but, as some have pointed out, might require too 
strong a skimming of the theory for its own liking.   
Given such a picture, to conclude that ‘the present King of France’ is simply 
a description of ours, for which there is no reference, and no object at all, is a relief. 
It would unmistakably separate out when what we say is asserted about something 
that is independently there in an ordinary experiential way, and just then has Being 
and Existence, and when not.  
Nevertheless, this convoluted world of Meinong’s appears to have 
something to it too. This explains why a good array of authors, including Chisholm 
(1973), Parsons (1974), the Routleys (1973), and Jaquette (1982, 1996) or Lambert 
(1974), to name a few, have defended or logically elaborated consonant views, as 
well as its recent resurrection in the form of more or less watered down 
contemporary Neo-Meinongian positions, for example, Priest (2005), Berto (2008), 
Crane (2012), Eklund (2005). The difficulty is how to place some Meinongian 
insights so that it is worth all the efforts of his ‘ontology’ in a helpful way, without 
making us say what we should not be saying. My purpose, thus, is to try to make 
sense of this comprehensive picture of beings of the beyond, in such a way that it 
allows us to keep the gains of Russell´s work. In doing so, I am not going to 
concentrate directly on Meinong´s proposals, but will proceed rather freely in 
analysing the different modalities of ‘non-existents’ above independently. 
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3. From fictions to ‘reals’ and back again 
I will initiate my journey into the realm of Not-Being by considering first ‘the 
fictionals’. I am going to use a little star to distinguish these ‘beings’* from those 
belonging to the realm of Being in some ordinary experiential sense (those that 
would correspond in Meinong’s own ontology to ‘objects that have real Being’). 
The * is not meant here to suggest that we have to do with a specific way of being, 
of the sort that ‘is not’, as in Meinong, but in the sense that it is not meant literally. 
Since, as should have become clear, the separation between Being and Existence 
(or ‘there being objects that have no Being’) is, in my view, utterly confusing. The 
peculiarity of such fictional, so-called ‘beings’*, is that they actually could not be 
unmasked through a Russellian analysis, since they never wore a mask, so to speak. 
According to Russell´s analysis, the term ‘Sherlock Holmes’ in sentences such as 
(1) ‘Sherlock Holmes played the violin’, is to be seen as a definite description 
(recording the main features attributed to Sherlock Holmes in Doyle’s novels). We 
would then prove that there is no such experiential individual that satisfies it. 
Without entering the difficulties that such a descriptive account of proper names is 
seen to have in the later discussion,11 I would say that the real issue here is a 
different one. Let us reconstruct the sentence above in Russellian terms, where SH 
stands for Sherlock Homes and V for ‘plays the violin’. 
 (1)					∃(𝑥)'𝑆𝐻(𝑥) ∧ 𝑉(𝑥), ∧	∀𝑦	('𝑆𝐻(𝑦) ∧ V(y), ↔ (𝑥 = 𝑦)) 
The second part of the sentence expresses the uniqueness and identity of the so-
described ‘being’*. What is the problem then? In the non-fictional case of ‘the 
present King of France’, or, for a change, ‘the first female President of Russia’, a 
Russellian reconstruction makes clear that there is no experiential individual 
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satisfying the description and therefore no such real existent being we are talking 
about. However, it might be that these sentences uttered in some other moment of 
history come out true. It is possible that we might, on some occasion, find an 
individual who corresponds to the description. So, here we take the sentence ‘the 
first female President of Russia has a dog’, where the FFPR stands for the subject 
and D for the predicate. 
 (2)				∃(𝑥)(𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑅(𝑥) 	∧ 𝐷(𝑥) ∧	∀(𝑦)((𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑅(𝑦) ∧ 𝐷(𝑦)) ↔ (𝑥 = 𝑦)) 
 
We expect this sentence to be satisfied by an existent actual being that exhibits 
those properties if we are to find the sentence true. Comparing this now with the 
sentence (1) above, we see that although it has the same form, the peculiarity of (1) 
is not that it is not satisfied by any existent individual having the characteristics 
attributed to the assumed Sherlock, but, rather, that it could not be. Why? Not 
because there could be many, as Kripke once argued (1980: 58), but because, as the 
second part of the sentence makes clear, there is only one such being, and even if 
we should find another satisfying most of the characteristics of Holmes, it could not 
be him. It is a characteristic of the authentic and unique Sherlock Holmes that he is 
fictional, and an ordinary existent one would not have such a character. Therefore, 
while sentence (1) does presume the existence of an individual we are talking about, 
it is not open for saturation. It is rather already satisfied by our fictional individual. 
This means that in speaking about Sherlock Holmes, we do not have a normal 
unsaturated sentence but an already saturated one. In contrast, sentence (2) is and 
should remain unsaturated by any positive object, as long as no existential 
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individual satisfies it. However, if we reconstruct our sentence (1) in the following 
way, including F as a predicate for fictionality, 
 
(1) * ∃(𝑥)%𝐹(𝑥) ∧ 	𝑆𝐻(𝑥) ∧ 𝑉(𝑥), ∧	∀𝑦	(%𝐹(𝑦) 	∧ 𝑆𝐻(𝑦) ∧ V(y), ↔ (𝑥 = 𝑦))	
   
and then we take ourselves to have a fictional being named ‘Sherlock Holmes’ 
satisfying the sentence, we fall back into the contradictory claim that there is (or 
exists) a being (without star, since we are talking about existence without 
qualification) such that he has the extra property of being fictitious. Then, since 
‘fictitious’ means ‘not really existent’, or so we take it to mean, we obtain our 
paradox. We actually go directly to what Russell found ‘intolerable’ in Meinong’s 
view of the idea of ‘objects that do not have existence’, objects that are graspable, 
and in a way are externally there but do not exist.12 But if we reconstruct the 
sentence as in  
(1) ** Fic 𝐸𝑥%(𝑆𝐻(𝑥) ∧ 𝑉(𝑥), ∧	∀𝑦	%(𝑆𝐻(𝑦) ∧ V(y), ↔ (𝑥 = 𝑦))) 
 
using a fictional operator to apply it to the existential quantifier and all that follows, 
then both the description and its saturation by our presumed existent unique 
individual come out as fictitious. Being fictional is not here predicated of a pre-
given object, but through the operator Fic it is meant to characterise existence itself 
and all that is attributed to it (the objects that are part of existence, their properties, 
and their relations). Existence is not a property but a presumption and, therefore, 
merely fictional. Furthermore, we should separate out here too the existential claim 
(the existentially quantified sentence) and the existential presumption that there 
would really be* a unique object that saturates it: the presumption of an individual, 
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call it Fica, that does satisfy (1)**. That is, we need not just say that such and such 
exists, but to represent it to some extent as an existent individual who would, for 
example, occupy a different spatio-temporal point than the other individuals in a 
fictional play, and picture his continuity and spatial moves along the story, his 
interactions with others, and so on. The proposal, therefore, departs from the 
nuclear/extranuclear distinction or the encoding/exemplifying view, since it does 
not amount to acknowledging a merely predicative mode of existence. 
To some extent, the reconstruction presented in (1)** might conform more 
likely with certain forms of pretence accounts (such as Walton 1990). But, for now, 
I would not want to commit myself to any label until the complete contours and 
implications of the position I shall be defending are in place. The specific 
formulation chosen in (1)**, regardless of possible coincidences with other 
proposals too,13 is thought to serve the interests of the view I am leading to and 
should be read in the terms proposed.  
Interesting here, from my perspective, is the perfect analogy of the structure 
of fictional discourse, whose definite descriptions are already satisfied by a unique 
individual, with respect to the standard practice where ordinary existent individuals 
are assigned to corresponding existential sentences. What makes Sherlock Holmes 
more than a mere description is precisely the (fictional) presumption of a unique 
individual who would exist and who satisfies the description. Mere possibilities 
(potential existents), such as ‘the individual who is a combination of human and 
canine DNA’ or ‘the golden pencil on my table’, are not presumed to have any 
individual satisfying corresponding descriptions. As we put it at the outset, 
‘possibilities’ aspire to ordinary existential satisfaction; correspondingly, their 
existential sentences would only be fulfilled if, for example, a real golden pencil is 
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to be found on my desk, turning the possibility into a reality and the sentence into 
a true one. If we, therefore, subject them to proof in the Russellian experiential 
sense, we find corresponding descriptions to be empty. It is thus important not to 
attribute non-saturated definite descriptions positive denotation (contrary to what 
Meinong does with his So-seins in direct predications) and to trace a clear 
distinction between such merely possible statements and fictions. This distances my 
proposal too, I believe, from Meinongian-based free logic accounts (Lambert 
1960), since I do want to keep differences regarding commitments to existence.  
Now, the case of ‘non-actuals’ brings particularly interesting aspects to the 
problem. While it is easier to assimilate future beings to mere possibilities and 
understand them along the same lines, past individuals raise interesting questions. 
It seems to me very weird to think of my deceased father as a mere description. I 
actually consider myself as being able to refer back to him, to refer to the individual 
who was there. But how can that be? Kripkean ‘causal chains’ tell a story of me 
referring back to the individual who was baptised ‘XYZ’, and whom I call ‘my 
father’. But the above does not say much about how this is possible, nor does it 
amount to any commitment regarding the acquired status of the referred object. 
Actually, if we look at it, the whole past itself does not exist at all! For all that is 
said, he could perfectly well be counted as a Meinognian object with non-existence. 
If, on the other hand, I use Russell’s procedure, a corresponding existential sentence 
would come out false. There is (unfortunately) no such person to be encountered 
anymore. But now what has suddenly struck me as strange is how I have been 
referring to him all along… as he was there. What has really changed?  First, there 
were times when I was away for a long period and could not continuously check on 
him. He could have not even been there, and I would have kept referring to him just 
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the same. My knowledge of his past existence is no warranty that I am referring to 
an existent being. More worryingly still, the problem expands when considering 
that we have in fact no warranty at all; neither can we be said to be referring to an 
existent being if all we have is the past. The whole issue ignites then when thinking 
that this does not just happen with my father, but with all and everything else. How 
do I keep referring to it all, if my presumed existent beings are not literally existent 
for me after they pass my surveillance – my experience of them? Testimony can 
occasionally serve this purpose, but I do not keep reconfirming through others the 
persistence in Being of my objects of reference either. What about whole cities and 
oceans and my very past infancy with its populated ingredients, places, and 
encounters? This is a real black hole in our tidy permanent picture of world stability 
– one we will inescapably have to deal with.  
On the other hand, while sentences about ‘the golden pencil on my desk’ 
would be satisfied by finding a unique golden pencil on my desk, no future found 
individual could satisfy the description of my father. He is a complete individual 
(in Meinong’s terms)14 in a way ‘the golden pencil on my desk’ is not (despite the 
unique character of the definite description). He is also complete in a way Sherlock 
Holmes isn’t. No new individual could, therefore, take his place. In this sense, non-
actual past beings clearly differ from mere possibles and fictions; of whose 
‘existence’ we merely now as much as the description states. But this uniqueness 
and the once-and-for-all saturated character of descriptions of my father by him do 
not solve the question of non-actuality, which, as we just saw, expands also to 
ordinary existent beings of which we just have past experience. Actually, if we 
consider this problem in its threatening radicality, there appears to be no way to 
give an account of the existential stability of our referents, the stability we 
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experience them as having for us, by attributing ourselves a capacity to ‘keep them 
present’. To keep, actually, our whole world present beyond the continuously fluent 
and transient character of our experiences. That is, to maintain something like an 
imaginative representation of our world while it decays — one where the different 
real interacting objects are attributed, at a representational level, different non-
colliding positions in space and are expected to have a continuity through time and 
mobility consistent with that of our own. If this is how we experience it, we must 
be able to situate these objects and their moves and relations as if in some sort of 
land cart.  
This stable ‘representation’ that carries its complete non-actual referential 
objects as something more than mere descriptions15 (and in that literal sense I mean 
the word) would very much resemble the kind of representation we reconstructed 
for the fictional case, where it was already suggested that making sense of fictional 
claims implies already a similar figuring capacity. This is especially striking in 
today’s virtual games, where we interestingly develop exactly that diagramming in 
a visually 3D representational way through which we put down our own way of 
conceiving it. However, maybe we should rather consider that if we can come to 
such a representational picture in fiction, it is because we already have at our 
disposal those representational capacities, since we need them to constitute what 
we consider our referential ‘reality’. Put differently, that reality, our reality, is 
fiction! This means that what we would be referring to when speaking of an existent 
being such as that referred to by ‘the ex-President Obama’ in the sentence ‘the ex-
President Obama is married’ should be reconstructed along similar lines to (1) **. 
With XPO standing for ex-President Obama and M for married, we would obtain: 
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(3) ∗∗    Fic∃(𝑥)'𝑋𝑃𝑂(𝑥) ∧ 𝑀(𝑥), ∧	∀𝑦	('𝑋𝑃𝑂(𝑦) ∧ M(y), ↔ (𝑥 = 𝑦)) 
 
where existence is postulated again at a representational level and presumed. 
Presumed too is the existence of a corresponding object satisfying the statement, as 
ex-President Obama himself is. Of course, I cannot literally mean that there is no 
difference between reality and fiction, and I do not. What I am saying is that 
referring to reals requires such a representation too (in the alluded literal sense of 
representation, beyond the mere putting into words or, counterpart, thoughts), 
though not alone. Therefore, since I am proposing a common reconstruction for 
reals and for fictions, I will change the fictional modifier Fic of the existential 
sentence above into a presumption modifier Press. Correspondingly, (3) ** turns 
into (3) ∗∗∗		"#$%% ∃𝑥	(𝑋𝑃𝑂(𝑥)… ). Moreover, (1) ** turns into (1) ∗∗∗	"#$%% ∃𝑥	(𝑆𝐻(𝑥)… ). The notion of ‘presumption’, unlike, for example, 
‘pretence’, implies not the faking of something, but the taking of it for granted, 
which I think is not the same.16 Actually, I think that in his talk of the ‘parafictional’ 
Recanati (2000) would be acknowledging this difference.17 According to Recanati, 
in parafictional uses of language we are not pretending but rather taking for true. 
This is akin to what I mean with ‘presumption’. We presume existence at the 
representational level. We presume that these beings exist throughout time, and we 
keep them represented as doing so, while this would just be (most of the time) a 
mere presumption. This is also the case in fiction, since our attitude in fiction is not 
that of mere supposing, but the attitude of something being the case, being true. 
Therefore, it is important to specify that with the term ‘presumption’ I am implying 
the idea of treating the corresponding individuals as real, postulating it to be the 
case, as opposed to merely supposing or entertaining a possibility that we do not 
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treat as true. But, if ‘ordinary existence’ is to be seen as a presumption in this sense, 
then how do we tell the difference between fictions and ordinary existents? 
Well, we should ask Russell. As he says, this is a matter of acquaintance, of 
the origin of the representation being based in direct acquaintance. Not understood 
literally in the sense Russell meant the notion of acquaintance, as we said, but just 
the idea that it is a form of experiential encounter that gives us grounds to claim 
that there is a correlation between our stable representation of the individual with 
something out there. We have, therefore, to do with a well-grounded presumption, 
which is what we call ‘real existence’. That is, the difference between the fictional 
and the real case is not at the level of the type of representation but is due to the 
grounding, or lack of it, of the representation. It is the mixed character of the real, 
perfectly experiential, on the one hand, and representational, on the other, that 
makes the difference.  
  So, if the representation, in (6) below, goes for both fiction and real 
existence, where our picture is kept stable throughout a lifespan (until we are told 
or experience otherwise), real existence departs from a prior time-fugitive 
originating grounding layer (5). 
(5) tfugitive                    
                                                  
(6)  tstable                                      
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At the experiential level in (5) at t2, our object is not there for us anymore, but at 
the representational level in (6) it remains in representational form as our referential 
object. The time-limited real experience of ex-President Obama builds the well-
grounded claim that our stable representation of him is real, as long as we (or 
someone else, in which case knowledge of direct experience is obtained by 
testimony) have a new experience to the contrary. Therefore, if we subject our claim 
to the Russellian proof at the experiential level: 
 (3)				∃(𝑥)'𝑋𝑃𝑂(𝑥) ∧ 𝑀(𝑥), ∧	∀𝑦	('𝑋𝑃𝑂(𝑦) ∧ M(y), ↔ (𝑥 = 𝑦)) 
 
It comes out positive as soon as we can provide an acquaintance experience or well-
grounded testimony of such. But the stable further existence of our referent, when 
considering it in the modified form of (3)***,  allows confirmation in the presumed 
modus too. Therefore, a claim of existence on the basis of such a stable 
representation, while it is a presumption, is a well-grounded one, since at some 
points of time we did have existential satisfaction in the Russellian sense. To put it 
differently, at the level of experience, where we situate ourselves, the very 
existential aspect of our claim in (3)*** Press∃𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑠	18 finds sufficient confirmation 
in (3) ∃𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑠,19 when satisfied by an individual a, while the satisfied existential 
claim in (1)*** does not have a parallel confirmation in (1). Therefore, our 
representation in (1)*** is known to us from the very beginning, not to be of the 
experiential reality. It is just our representational attitude that is of the same kind. 
In a sense, it is as if our Press∃𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑠	quantifier	acquires the status of a place holder, 
that is of a higher order ‘quantifier-variable’ of existence itself, that can be 
saturated or not by the real ∃𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑠	𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑟. 
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On the other hand, the type of justification for our claim in (3)*** is not just 
based on encounters, although it primarily is, but also a matter of knowledge. The 
knowledge is that unless there is a sudden decease, living beings continue to exist 
as we ourselves do. I am absolutely not pretending, though, that we would be doing 
all this labour of deduction consciously. It is more a necessary condition of 
possibility to be able to refer in a non-discontinuous way and also plan action and 
interactions with others towards the future. But in becoming aware of this, we can 
explain that we are well justified in doing so, keeping the representational stability 
of existence through the procedures mentioned. In some cases, where our 
experiential confirmation is really a continuous presential one, paved through 
continuous encounters and reconfirmations of existence, the presumption is almost 
equal to experiential reality, as happens with our own self, whose past we keep 
stable too and whose present existence we continuously experience.  
In the case of deceased non-actual beings, what we become is proof of their 
ceased existence. What we have is a (well-grounded) presumption of existence 
whose continuity is truncated up to a given point. Therefore, representational 
reference to the past, since stability makes it possible to refer back and forth to an 
individual, is still of the real existent kind, as it alludes to a time when there was 
still the grounded level of proof. But nothing of the sort is possible anymore in a 
present or future form.  
Notice that the proposal here is an epistemological one. It does not limit 
itself to say in the case of real existence, that there is an individual out there we take 
our semantics to refer to, as some authors have argued (for example, Parsons 1974). 
The idea is more radical in the sense that of necessity, the real existent object is just 
stable as a such for us through a representation. This means that we are not referring 
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to an existent individual in the experiential world all along and then we give a 
semantic account of it. But, rather, that our experience merely delivers a punctual 
basis and the representation is required for stability. 
4. Numbers 
As Frege (1884) well saw, counting unities requires separating them out through a 
concept.20 This, I believe, need not mean literally that we need ‘linguistic concepts’ 
to distinguish unities, as in some direct realist positions. 21 It also allows for a more 
basic pre-conceptual reading according to which there is no counting that is not 
done from a given perspective, by distinguishing some particular aspect on whose 
behalf individuals can be separated out from their surroundings. However, for the 
sake of simplicity, I will be referring to the ‘conceptual’ sorting out of unities. Yet, 
if we are to consciously become aware of what it is that we do in this process, we 
would be representing to ourselves this very operation (the conceptual detachment 
of a unity) in general terms, a procedure through which we figuratively capture our 
own activity. That is, we do not cognitively appraise it, as if it would be some 
further occurrence or experienceable phenomenon in our epistemic world, but 
rather we reconstruct what (we think) must be taking place through our own 
performance.  In doing so, two aspects should be distinguished: the very conceptual 
individuation and the real individual that results. Now, as I have argued elsewhere 
(Ramírez 2020a:160,168), I believe that, contrary to what Frege ended up capturing, 
it is the latter that constitutes the proper numerical unity. It is not the formal 
conceptual aspect, something that certainly would be equivalent to a class, but the 
corresponding representation of a real individual or a real object cut off from an 
extended background. To put it differently, it is the very stable representation of a 
(non-further saturable) real individual that constitutes the numerical unity. It is a 
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representation, but a representation of a reality. This is precisely, I think, the same 
kind of individual, of a singled-out object, we refer to, in both fiction and our 
representation of reality – not concepts, not classes, not mere descriptions, but the 
representation of the reality that satisfies our quantoren, and that is exactly the same 
as the numerical unity. While Frege, I believe, was initially orientated towards this, 
he shied away, since this would have brought him beyond the mere formal, 
analytical account to a representational one (more akin to the Kantian 
representation in Intuition).22 He miscalculated in thinking that the concept of the 
unity itself (or of a class of them) could be a substitution instance of further 
existential sentences, with the known disappointing consequences.23  
However, what results out of the considerations made, to put it concisely, is 
that Sherlock Holmes, after all, is just…a number – nothing we should wonder 
about, since he always was a master of disguise. But we should not feel too superior 
either, since, at the end of the day, we are a number too! But one of a mixed sort: 
half ghost, half real. Nevertheless, there are still ‘others’ in our list that might have 
it worse. 
 
5. Pure non-existents  
What are we to say of the family of ‘Vulcano’ and the like? We cannot presume 
their existence, since what we are presuming is that they have none; not even 
fictional. Giving an account of their predicated ‘non-existence’ has always been 
especially problematic. In Meinong’s ontology, we are saying of an ‘external 
object’, Vulcano, that non-existence is attributable to it. We obtain, therefore, the 
contradiction that there is something, we are denoting some object, that is not. 
Russell’s alternative reconstruction dispelled the puzzle, showing that it was simply 
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a non-satisfied description. So, we have an existential quantified sentence that 
proves to be non-saturated at the experiential level; just as in the case of Jupiter, we 
have one that is. A reconstruction of such sentences as if they would nevertheless 
be denoting some (low grade Being) objects, while posing no problem in fiction 
and by the stable representation of real existent objects when they are not present, 
is here to be avoided. It would block their capability of being saturated at the 
experiential level, which is the only one that could satisfy the kind of existential 
claim made through a statement postulating the existence of a corresponding planet. 
According to our knowledge at such a level, the sentence would be empty and, if 
we consider our proof of non-existence to be definite, then the very possibility 
considered would be denied. If this is the case, then we should conclude that: it is 
not possible that there is the object such and so.  
 But what happens when we have no proof one way or the other? What 
happens when we merely entertain the possible existence of an entity such as ‘the 
nearest by planet containing other intelligent beings’? These are finally the 
‘possible beings’ we have alluded to but not yet directly treated. As opposed to real 
existence and fiction, we are not representationally taking for granted their actual 
reality. That is not what we want to presume. We know there are no well-grounded 
reasons to claim real existence (nor to claim the contrary), and as opposed to fiction, 
we are not presuming them to be objects at the representational level either. 
Nevertheless, here too, we want to have the opportunity to consider them at the 
representational level, we actually do, in order to be able to talk about and operate 
with them, to consider future interactions with others or further consequences that 
their existence, actions, or reactions could have for us in our world. This is like if 
we would keep a chess game board and consider moves back and forth to analyse 
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what their consequences would be. In considering their possible real existence, we 
are entertaining not their actual reality but some possible alternative or future one. 
But how are we to do this without providing such sentences with a denotation, 
which, if at all, they ought to have (corresponding to the claim made) at the level 
of experiential reality? We cannot merely represent such an object as a presumption 
of existence, well-grounded or not, because that would confound it with real 
existents or fictions. Therefore, at the representational level, this must be 
reconstructed differently. 
That is, at the representational level, we pictured the resulting unities of 
conceptual individuation (those of saturated existential Russellian sentences) as 
being what we assume to be stable (well-grounded) realities. These are taken to 
have a corresponding experiential grounded level. Fictions, we said, differ in terms 
of their lack of this mixed character and grounding source. They are mere 
representations of existence. But we do just the same as we would if they were 
there, it is just that we are aware of their merely presumed character. This cannot 
be equally reconstructed in the ‘entertaining future or alternative reality’ cases, 
since we are in no way representing actual existence.24 We are, in fact, representing 
lack of existence, lack of object, since possibilities define themselves by ‘not being 
taken to be the case’.25 But how can that be? Here we have our puzzle back. This 
was, I guess, the difficulty with which Meinong was confronted. Although he saw 
in this sense no essential difference between fictions and possibilities, the quandary 
was to picture something that-is-not as if it would be. Yet, before, when giving an 
account of what it is that we represent when we depict an individual as existent, I 
argued that, ultimately, we had to do with numerical unities. If we say there are 
three cups on the shelf, we distinguish each cup through the concept and obtain 
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three unities of the sort. What remains outside conceptual individuation has no 
existence ‘as cup’, so it is nothing from the perspective of the concept.26 If we 
picture the existent unities of the cups, like in (4) a), below, and if we want to 
entertain possible cups that do not exist, this would amount to representing them in 
the territory of non-existence in (b), but relative to the concept of ‘cup’. 
 
 
 
So, if we entertain the possibility of there being two cups on the shelf, for example, 
that means presuming the non-existence of corresponding objects (to remain 
consistent with possibilities not being existent).27 However, in the sense that there 
are no objects of the sort and, thus, being consistent with Russell’s claim that such 
denoting expressions are not saturated, what we are doing is representing them like 
in (4)* above, as non-existent objects but as cups. Notice that there is a difference 
between saying: (i) ‘there is an object that does not exist’, and (ii) ‘an object does 
not exist’. We are saying (ii) and in this sense we talk of non-existent objects or 
non-existent cups, while Meinong was seduced to talk about (i). Now, if, as I stated 
previously, the general representation of numerical unities amounts to the 
representation of the application of a concept to some reality, what are these ghostly 
unities of non-existence? Well, I have argued (Ramirez 2020a, 2020b) that they are 
(4)* 
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the negative numbers. Negative numbers are absences: minus 1, minus 2, minus 3 
objects, which might be cups or whatever, if what we are considering is the non-
existence but possibility of three cups on the shelf, for example. This mere 
representing of the lack of cups is interesting from the perspective of searching for 
their reality. After all, it is just through a concept, as Frege stated, that we can 
distinguish unities, and it is through the concept of ‘cup’ that we are making ‘wholes 
for cups in the emptiness’ so to speak, that are nevertheless not to be counted ‘as 
cups’ and can be counted as cups not being there, and thus negative cups. In this 
way we can accommodate Meinong’s notion that the cups are ‘so-seins’, that is, 
they have the predicative form of ‘being cups’ and, as he argued, ‘you can count 
what doesn´t exist’ (1988: 5). There are two negative numbers of cups on the shelf. 
If we assume this is right and go back to our Vulcano case, what is the difference 
between Vulcano of whose non-existence we have proof and the possibilities just 
considered?  
If we pay attention, the difference between both parallels with the distinction 
before between fictions and realities. At the representational level, they are the 
same, but at the grounding level, we have a difference. Correspondingly, in the 
Vulcano case, we would be representing it just the same as by possible negative 
existents, with the difference that here we have a well-grounded proof of non-
existence, the non-saturated Russellian sentence at the experiential level, in addition 
to proof of its non-existence. We can thereby make sense of the ‘negative number’ 
Vulcano, which we can say does not have real existence on the basis of a proof 
according to the Russellian method. The mixed character of the representation – 
half experiential (proof of absence at the experiential level), half ghost (negative 
number) so to speak – applies here too. However, if the proof is definitive, as we 
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stated previously, we can simply deny 𝑁𝑜𝑡 −	∃𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡"#$%%, that is, the negative 
existential presupposition as a whole.  
I am not going to enter much into the realm of the quasi-reals, since actually 
an explicit Russellian sentence at the experiential level would exhibit the purported 
satisfier as a hoax. Therefore, the status of ‘quasi-real’ would thereby have to be 
abandoned, and we could turn the corresponding individuals into fictions, attribute 
them a non-literal sense, or make them disappear. Although understanding how 
such terms come into being and their deceiving force is quite interesting, in our 
context they do not add much new. The case of generalia, however, I will leave for 
a future occasion, since although they would behave as reals in being partially well 
grounded, they pose a particularity of their own. 
 A different issue is with the impossible, which raises much perplexity. As 
opposed to pure non-existents, with impossibles it is not that we have proof of their 
non-existence. It is that we need not even try, since we know in advance that no 
proof could be found. One option would be to see impossibles as irrational numbers, 
which do express the impossibility of a numerical distribution in any conclusive 
numerical terms, obtaining a number that, in some sense, is not a countable number 
at the same time. It is a magnitude not capturable by one unity or the other, not 
expressively by any discrete counting, since whenever one splits a continuum, one 
originates a difference between the unities and the continuum. This is often 
irrelevant, but sometimes it is not.  
So, if an extension is a continuum between two discrete unities – call them 
‘𝑎’ and ‘𝑏’  (which can also be understood as parts and parts of parts of unities) – 
there is always a difference between the numerical division and the ‘not-
numerically divided’, and therefore something in between the split parts. Since it 
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has no presence as any kind of countable unity that can be considered ‘something’ 
(it is no expressible number), it does not have existence as either the one or the 
other; or, alternatively, it could be included in either. In a sense, it can be considered 
both ‘a’ and ‘b’, but paradoxically ‘a’ defines itself by ‘not being b’, from which it 
has been detached. So, it could not be ‘b’ but, at the same time, it is not something 
‘other than b’, and so it can also be ‘b’. But, then again, ‘b’ defines itself by not 
being ‘a’, and so it cannot be ‘a’. However, since it is not ‘something other than a’, 
it can also be ‘a’. So, we obtain this contradictory result that it is ‘a’ and ‘b’, but if 
it is the one it could not be the other. Just the same as the ‘round square’, we figure 
out something in the middle of the opposition between round and square – 
something that actually cannot be, since if it is round it is not square, and vice versa. 
Even at a predicative level, and even as a ‘so-sein’ in Meinongnian terms, it is 
contradictory, since it is so and not so at the same time. Is it not precisely this 
position we are somehow imagining? Could that do? I will leave it here, since I am 
aware this might strike one as slightly strange but do please give it thought.   
With this, I believe we have ordered our ontological picture without doing 
wrong to the extremely important distinction between the existent and the non-
existent in Russellian experiential terms, while at the same time making room for 
some of the Meinongian insights. Meinong’s non-existents (including fictions, 
possibles, pure non-existents, and impossibles) do not have room in our ontology, 
for which experientiality, as both Russell and Kant claimed, is the basic 
requirement. Their presumed existential quantor is a non-saturated one, as we might 
put it. Unlike Meinong, who explicitly denied we had to do with representations 
(1988: §4, p.9) 28, we assigned them a place at the representational level, where 
picturing what is not part of the experiential world and distinguishing it from what 
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is, is not absurd; furthermore, we came to conclude that even the stability of our 
actual referential world owes much to such a representational level too. Reality, as 
we understand it, would not be the reality it is without it. 
 
6. Final thoughts  
The picture that emerges from the deliberations above is one in which our 
representational thinking about objects – real or fictive, possible, impossible, or 
non-existent – which both Meinong and Frege (with the exception of the impossible 
in the last case) took to be objective, shares the same basic structure as our dealing 
with mathematical numbers. That is, in thinking about some such individual, we 
would be applying a certain formal structure to some units that are made available 
in representational modus as something external, and we are ultimately operating 
with numbers.29 In addition, the other way around, when we do mathematics, we 
are, at the end of the day, thinking about reality and its possibilities, or even 
impossibilities, to better understand it. 
Pretending that with our rational reconstruction of such a representational 
level (which we take for granted but do not experience as such epistemically) we 
would have to do with an enhancement of the world of experience amounts to the 
same kind of failure Kant so carefully separated away in his Critique of Pure 
Reason. The confusion is between transcendental reconstruction and transcendent 
knowledge beyond the realm of experience. In the first case, we are not acquiring 
any real knowledge. We are rather reconstructing what has to be the case for this 
cognitive activity, characteristic of our knowledge and thinking about the world, to 
be the way we experience it. Moreover, we do this in the cognitive terms we 
understand, figuring out the conditions that would make it possible, just as we try 
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to figure out the likely forces behind some events in the world. Of course, we 
ourselves belong to that experiential world, as does our brain, but we cannot 
properly acquire experiential knowledge about how we think. Thinking is an 
experience, but how it occurs is not30, just as are experiences those of other internal 
events, such as pains, pressures, or emotions, not our capturing of them. We can 
have second-order thoughts about our speaking and thinking or our emotions of 
which we are aware, as some have suggested,31 but there is no experience of how 
we come to do so. This is more a matter of inferring that we must have done it, 
since we are aware of them. The representational structure of our thinking about 
existent and non-existent objects or numbers is something we would become aware 
of in an inferential sense: it must be like that. We know we think in such a way, but 
how we manage to do so is a later re-enactment. If we are thereby right, it does take 
place, but our knowledge of it is no direct experience, and we cannot claim to know 
it to be. Therefore, it is not true that there are any such external objects or numbers, 
the weeds ought to be purged in this sense, not merely domestically arranged. But 
it is true that we must represent them as being (or as lacking). 
Finally, it might be claimed that our own representational forces are part of 
the world, and they indiscriminately are so, just as any other forces we exert, but 
they generate no further realities beyond themselves. 
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1 The expression ‘Heimatlose Gegenstände’ is Meinong’s own. See Meinong 1907. 
2 This requirement, of course, requires some care since non-harmonic concepts (among which are 
the quasi-existences mentioned later) characterise themselves, precisely, by an imbalance between 
their introduction and elimination rules that would appear to justify illegitimate existential claims. 
3 The identity requirement, pressed emphatically by both Frege (1884) and Quine (1969), as well 
as the spatio-temporal condition, that Quine underwrites too, are here necessary though not 
sufficient conditions, since numbers, for example, would not appear in my account (following 
criteria a), b) c)) as entities ordinarily taken to exist. 
4 Note that the difference between Phlogiston and a fictional entity is that (unlike our notions of 
Darth Vader or Madame Bovary) our very idea of Phlogiston considered it to be a chemical 
substance that was part of the experiential world. That is, it was expected to be experientially 
detectable (at least at some point and time) and thought to have already a causal impact on the world. 
Once this is proven wrong, the kind of entity we meant with Phlogiston ceases to exist. Someone 
might indeed invent a story in which a fictional chemical substance with the name ‘Phlogiston’ is 
taken to exist (in the fiction) but, since it would no longer have the pretence to be part of the 
experiential world, it would not be the same. Such ‘pure non-existents’ also differ from ‘Quasi-
existents’ in the fact that there is no specific identifiable experience any more on whose behalf they 
are considered indirectly proven. 
5 With this term, I clearly do not refer to what Meinong (1988:10-11) characterised as ‘quasi-beings’ 
(Quasisein). I am, actually, not following any given characterisation at all, but referring to a 
distinction previously made in Ramírez (2018: 5) 
6 Ramírez (2018, 2012) 
7 Some have argued that music, for example, is a merely temporal experience, but this is 
disputable since sound waves do seem to be present in some locations. 
8 I will use ‘Being’ and ‘Non-Being’ capitalized when used as substantives, such as in ‘has Being 
or has Non-Being’. Otherwise I will use the non-capitalized ‘being’ or ‘non-being’ both as 
adjectives in “an object of the non-being sort” or to speak of individual ‘beings’. 
9 These are my own translations from the original German text. 
10 That he does not mean merely existence in the representation; see passages such as this:  
 (…) that the object possibly needs the representation ‘not to exist’, just as little as to exists, and 
even that, just to the extent as it should require of ‘being represented’ maximum an existence -
existence in the representation, that is ‘pseudo-existence’- as a result (Meinong 2018: §4, 9). 
11 Actually, I am not interested at present in the difficulties of determining which description would 
be the adequate reconstruction of a proper name, or how it is that individuals with differing 
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information manage to refer to the same individual. Rather, my focus is on how we prove whether 
the individual who we are attempting to refer to by some, call it, ‘ideal description’ is there or not. 
Of course, there can be differences in the particular aspects being proved by certain individuals 
depending on the information they have. Nevertheless, the way they are proved, in general, by 
human beings, can be the same. This is so even in the limited case where all someone might have as 
a description is that there was someone baptised as ‘Holmes’. 
12 Such a formulation might suit the case where an existential claim is made that describes an apple 
with such and such properties, and we then saturate the empty space with a fake apple as the unique 
one satisfying the specific characteristics of the description. Such an ‘apple’ could be seen as really 
existent though as a fake. It might be supposed that regarding a painted picture of Sherlock, put in 
place of the description could do for its existence as well, we could pretend it is the individual we 
are referring to. But since the paper figure would not satisfy the descriptions attributed to Sherlock 
Holmes, it would not do either.  
13 For example, other defenders of the pretence view, such as Recanati (2000). 
14 According to Meinong, while real individuals are complete, fictional individuals and possible ones 
are not. We just have as complete a characterization as the description goes and that leaves many 
informational gaps: did Sherlock have an ant? Was he ever in Albacete? There can be no true or 
false answer to that.  
15 I found Recanati’s (2000) proposal to solve this problem by appealing to descriptive files very 
interesting, and he is probably right that we store files that way too. However, I think his proposal 
is not enough for several reasons. First, such files need not imply taking for existent and referring 
all along to the individual the file is about, the one satisfying the corresponding descriptions. Second, 
referring to such an individual as existent requires us making sense of its position and its possible 
further moves, possible future encounters with ourselves or others in other places in a consistent and 
timely manner. This requires, I believe, activating some spatio-temporal representational 
coordinates. Therefore, this position might be complementary to his. Actually, Recanati (2018), in 
discussing parafictional discourse, poses precisely the problem I allude to in defence of a 
‘presumption’ instead of a ‘pretence’ view. The parafictional use possibly allows a better 
appreciation of the point. As Recanati stated, in parafictional uses, we are not pretending; we are 
taking the claims to be true about a given object, for whose purpose the representational object in 
my picture very well serves. Of course, since we move at the representational level, neither objects 
nor properties are real, but just in representational modus. Actually, Recanati (2000) mentioned a 
proposal that defends the existence of ‘dot objects.’ I do not know enough about that position, but 
maybe it comes closer to what I am proposing. 
16 In my account we are not simply linguistically pretending that there is an individual such and so, 
and pretending sentences about it to be true, but we are actually literally representing some such 
individual occupying a given space, having a continuity through time, etc. and truly referring to it.  
17 See footnote above on Recanati. 
18 Kaplan (2005) considered that Russell’s analysis implied no ontological commitment and could 
be applied to non-existents. I believe that goes completely against Russell’s very idea. Nevertheless, 
I have been applying it at both the representational level and the experiential level, not at all because 
it indifferently applies to both in equal form, but because if we apply the Press modifier to existence, 
a Press modified version of Russell’s sentence lends itself to be used in this context too.   
19 This mixed character explains why at the experiential level in the moment of acquaintance we can 
directly refer a lá Kripke to ‘Gödel’, for example, while later on any explanation of who we mean, 
at that level, for those who lack direct acquaintance, must be in descriptive terms, even if the 
description reduces to the individual that was named Gödel at tn in place p. At the same time, though, 
we have a sense that we can keep on directly referring to him, because at the representational level, 
in keeping a corresponding representative of Gödel, we do.  
20 ‘Denn der Begriff, dem die Zahl beigelegt wird, grenzt im Allgemeinen das unter ihn Fallende in 
bestimmter Weise ab. Der Begriff „Buchstabe des Wortes Zahl” grenzt das Z gegen das a, dieses 
gegen das h, u. s. w. ab.’ (Frege 1884: § 54, 42). 
21 To this point too Ramírez (2020a:160, footnote 27) 
22 I use ‘Intuition’ with a capital I to refer to the Kantian notion, to separate it out from the mere idea 
of ‘intuition’ as a presumed alternative way of acquiring knowledge.  
23 Ramírez 2020a:161-168   
24 Unfortunately, I cannot enter to comment on the differences of my account here with the modal 
proposals offered by Berto (2008) and Priest (2005), but I guess they will be apparent.   
25 We can distinguish epistemological and ontological uses of ‘possibility’. This can be due to our 
knowledge: something possibly exists, but we do not know. Or it can be an ontological matter: 
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something does not exist, but it possibly could. The claim affects surely the second case. However, 
since we are the ones who represent reality according to our knowledge, at the practical level 
ignorance of whether something is the case amounts to not counting it as real either.  
26 I am basing myself in this section in both, Ramírez 2020a and 2020b, here specifically in 
2020a:169-170). 
27 Compare with Ramirez (2020b:18-19) 
28 Text quoted in footnote 10. 
29 I would not want to commit to fictionalism in mathematics, since this representational aspect is 
not simply pretence, but belongs to the very constitutive way of our knowledge of the world. 
30 A similar line of reasoning concerning this point is to be found in Ramírez (2020a:176-177) 
31 In a sense, Recanati (2000) captures this idea through his notion of ‘metarepresentation’.  
However, I am not completely sure if he understands it the same way. To be sure, the notion of 
representation in this paper, more akin to the Kantian representation in Intuition, is different from 
that in Recanati’s picture. 
